Contract Design to Sequester Carbon in Agricultural Soils by Chiroleu-Assouline, Mireille & Roussel, Sébastien
Contract Design to Sequester Carbon in Agricultural
Soils
Mireille Chiroleu-Assouline, Se´bastien Roussel
To cite this version:
Mireille Chiroleu-Assouline, Se´bastien Roussel. Contract Design to Sequester Carbon in Agri-
cultural Soils. Documents de travail du Centre d’Economie de la Sorbonne 2010.60 - ISSN :
1955-611X. 2010. <halshs-00505137>
HAL Id: halshs-00505137
https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00505137
Submitted on 22 Jul 2010
HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access
archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci-
entific research documents, whether they are pub-
lished or not. The documents may come from
teaching and research institutions in France or
abroad, or from public or private research centers.
L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est
destine´e au de´poˆt et a` la diffusion de documents
scientifiques de niveau recherche, publie´s ou non,
e´manant des e´tablissements d’enseignement et de
recherche franc¸ais ou e´trangers, des laboratoires
publics ou prive´s.
 Documents de Travail du 
Centre d’Economie de la Sorbonne 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Contract Design to Sequester Carbon in Agricultural Soils 
 
Mireille CHIROLEU-ASSOULINE, Sébastien ROUSSEL 
 
2010.60 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Maison des Sciences Économiques, 106-112 boulevard de L'Hôpital, 75647  Paris Cedex 13 
http://ces.univ-paris1.fr/cesdp/CES-docs.htm 
ISSN : 1955-611X 
 
Contract Design to Sequester Carbon
in Agricultural Soils
Mireille Chiroleu-Assouline Sébastien Roussely
March 22, 2010
Abstract
According to several studies, agricultural carbon sequestration could be a relatively
low cost opportunity to mitigate greenhouse gas (GHG) concentration and a promis-
ing means that could be institutionalised. However the potential for additional carbon
quantities in agricultural soils is critical and comes from the agricultural rms behav-
iour with regards to land heterogeneity. In this paper, our aim is to set incentive
mechanisms to enhance carbon sequestration by agricultural rms. A policymaker has
to arrange incentives as agricultural rms have private information and do not sponta-
neously switch to the required practices. Moreover, a novelty in our paper is to show
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that the potential for additional carbon sequestration is similar to an exhaustible re-
source. As a result, we construct an intertemporal principal-agent model with adverse
selection. Our contribution is to specify contracts in order to induce truthful revela-
tion by the rms regarding their intrinsic characteristics towards carbon sequestration,
while analytically characterizing the optimal path to sequester carbon as an exhaustible
resource.
JEL classication: D60 - D62 - E62 - H23 - Q28.
Keywords: Adverse selection, Agriculture, Carbon sequestration, Incentives, Land-use.
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1 Introduction
Climate change is currently one of the most prominent international issue during the last
years. After some di¢ cult negotiations and a long time needed before its ratication by
the requested number of countries, the Kyoto Protocol came into force in February 2005.
The Annex 1 Members agreed upon di¤entiated e¤orts of abatement of their emissions of
carbon dioxide in order to stabilize the GHG concentration in the atmosphere. Carbon dioxide
accounts for 80 per cent of GHG emissions from developed countries. One means for reducing
CO2 levels is carbon sequestration into forests or agricultural soils. As emphasized by Young
(2003), the issue of establishing credits for forestry and agriculture as carbon sinks was
hotly debated during the negotiations and, if carbon sequestration is integrated through
forest sinks in the Kyoto protocol (article 3.3), additional land use activities are currently
negotiated through article 3.4 of the Protocol.
Additional carbon quantities in agricultural soils are gained by the implementation of new
crops or new management practices. Signicant illustrations of these practices are conser-
vation tillage, irrigation and mineral fertilization. It has been pointed out that agricultural
carbon sequestration could be a relatively low cost opportunity to mitigate GHG concen-
tration and a promising means that could be institutionalised (McCarl and Schneider, 2000;
Schneider, 2002). In fact, in comparing di¤erent countries, the place given to carbon se-
questration in their strategy to reduce GHG emissions has been very di¤erent. Young et
al. (2007) compare the US and the EU choices: while the US has not ratied the Kyoto
Protocol but has been encouraging the use of agricultural and forestry carbon sequestration,
3
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the EU ratied it as soon as 2002 but without using agricultural soil carbon sequestration in
its strategy. A very recent study of European researchers shows indeed that Europe should
consider at the contrary as a priority the development of land management policies which aim
at reducing GHG emissions (Schulze et al., 2009). According to Feng et al. (2002) (referring
to Lal et al., 1998), the potential for carbon sequestration of U.S. cropland through improved
management could be set to 75208 MMTC/year. A later study, by Sperow et al. (2003),
estimated that agricultural sequestration of carbon could account for the US for 40% of the
reduction of GHG emissions needed to abate american emissions at the level of 1990. In
Europe, Freibauer et al. (2004) estimated that carbon soil sequestration could have provided
9% of the reductions required in 2005.
The various perceptions of the carbon sequestration potential by the agricultural sec-
tor certainly lie in the di¤erence in the share of abatement that agriculture could hold in
each region. However European distrust about agricultural carbon sequestration also springs
from the questionable permanence of the carbon storage, the di¢ culties to measure actual
sequestration, the uncertainties concerning the incurred costs, and the issue of designing the
appropriate incentives to induce farmers to adopt new practices.
Scientic studies (INRA, 2002) show that the sequestration process is essentially non
linear. After a move toward more sequestering management practices, carbon sequestration
increases rapidly, then slows down to reach a maximum level depending on the nature of
the soil, of the crops and on the practices itselves. Insights show that this is not possible to
sequester an innite quantity of carbon on a given plot of land. The adoption of particular
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practices for a given crop enables to sequester a nite quantity of carbon that is an absolute
potential for carbon sequestration associated to these crop and practices. This is why a plot
of land can be dened by its potential for additional carbon sequestration which is the gap
between the maximal absolute potential for carbon sequestration in this area and the carbon
stored for a given time period. The potential for additional carbon sequestration depends on
land quality1 as well as on past and upcoming crops and practices (McCarl et al., 2000). In
case of any move back to less sequestering pratices, carbon release is even more faster than
was carbon sequestration. Taking this specic dynamics into account, Ragot and Schubert
(2008) show that the only optimal policy is to encourage permanent carbon storage.
Farmers do not switch spontaneously to practices that increase social benets and the
adoption rate is likely to be lower than the socially optimal one. They indeed assess their pri-
vate costs whilst ignoring the positive externality through higher sequestration that enhances
social benets. In this way, a full assessment that compares carbon sequestration costs and
gains should be conducted. Schneider (2002) states these di¤erent costs as adjustment costs,
opportunity costs, stickiness, market changes, and environmental and international co-e¤ect.
The great heterogeneity that can be observed again between countries regarding the use of
di¤erent management practices reect the heterogeneity of sequestration costs. For example,
Weersink et al. (2005) state that the protability of reduced tillage is not signicantly dif-
ferent than the protability of conventional practices, which is consistent with the observed
common use of both tillage methods in Canada. Kurkalova (2006) observes that, switching to
conservation practices does not always imply a monetary sacrice for farmers, because even
1By quality we mean the environmental properties of soils.
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without any subsidy, on average more than one third of U.S. acres are in conservation tillage.
This is not the case in Europe where the practices which have the highest sequestration rates
are also the less protable (Pendell et al., 2007). De Cara and Jayet (2000) insist on the
heterogeneity of GHG abatement costs among crop-oriented and livestock farms. In many
developing countries, such as in West Africa, according to Gonzalez-Estrada (2008), best
management practices that generate the highest carbon sequestration rates are economically
not feasible for the majority of local smallholders, unless considerable nancial support is
provided. As a consequence, policymakers generally have to counteract direct costs while
inducing sustainable sequestering practices to increase carbon sequestration in soils. To this
end, they have the opportunity to propose monetary transfers as subsidies to bring about
suitable practices.
Nevertheless, the role of history and the nature of agricultural soils lead to a great spatial
heterogeneity about the potentials of carbon sequestration which prevents from implemen-
tating casual regulation policies. This heterogeneity indeed involves high monitoring costs if
the regulator is concerned about rewarding farmers accordingly to their results. Kurkalova et
al. (2004) point out the di¢ culties incurred by a regulator willing to di¤erentiate payments
between farmers in the absence of eld-scale measurement technologies. Instead of measuring
the annual amount of carbon accumulated in each plot of land, one could imagine to observe
the practices employed by the farmer and to estimate the level of the accumulated carbon
stock. But in fact, this process would imply quite high monitoring costs too (for example, if
the nature of the crops can be monitored with observation satellite, but more usually with
6
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on-eld inspection, the practices are not easily controlled). The same paper enlightens the
related problem of the basis for incentive payments. Either the payment is based on the
total amount of carbon stored in the soil, or the payment rewards carbon stored above an
initial baseline, that might be the level of carbon contained in the soil at the beginning of the
program, and then precocious adopters of more sequestering practices would be penalized.
Two kinds of subsidies are available for a policymaker: a per-tonne subsidy and a per-
hectare or lump-sum subsidy. Pautsch et al. (2001) and Antle et al. (2003) emphasize
that the heterogeneity across plots of lands in terms of sequestration potential implies that
per-hectare subsidies should be individualized to reect this heterogeneity. Since monitoring
costs are high, a per-hectare subsidy could only be based on average sequestration rates and
it could therefore be less e¢ cient than per-tonne subsidies. However, on-site monitoring
costs of the stored carbon are high as well and technical constraints generally prevent the
implementation of per-tonne subsidies. Even if the ranking between the two kinds of subsidy
depends on the gap between losses of e¢ ciency (per-hectare) and monitoring costs (per-ton),
the preference is actually often given to per-hectare subsidies. Other instruments are rarely
considered, except Pendell et al. (2007) who study the incentives to adopt conservation
practices provided by marketable carbon credits. One could think that the implementation
of carbon credits raises the same issue about monitoring costs of the e¤ective amount of stored
carbon. However, Mooney et al. (2004) evaluate these costs for the small-grain producing
region of Montana and conrm that the costs of measuring and monitoring are greater in
the most heterogeneous areas; their amount is only around 3% of the value of carbon credit
7
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(this result depends crucially on the price of carbon credits). Antle and Diagana (2003) see
the main incentive to sequester carbon in the carbon price established by the environmental
regulations implied by the Kyoto Protocol and the raising concern about climate change. Wu
and Babcock (1996) develop a payment scheme that overcomes the information asymmetry
between farmers and regulator and accounts for the deadweight losses of distortionary taxes in
the case of an environmental stewardshipprogram whereby farmers receive direct payments
for the services they provide.
One important e¤ect of switches toward more sequestering practices is that they gener-
ally bring about other external e¤ects. Plantinga and Wu (2003) point out the important
environmental co-benets provided by an a¤orestation program in Wisconsin. Nevertheless,
this is a still pendant debate to assess if the positive externalities are greater than the neg-
ative ones. In fact, reduced tillage or adoption of no-tillage is shown to decrease soil erosion
which in turn can reduce nutrient pollution of groundwater, but negative environmental ex-
ternalities can result from increased use of pesticides (Schneider, 2002). Many studies, like
Weersink et al. (2005), consider that reduced tillage can also allow reduced use of nitrogen
and phosphate fertilizers, but according to Wu and Babcock (1998), no clear evidence can
be found of a link between the adoption of no-tillage and the use of nitrogen fertilizer and
even less evidence of reduction in phosphate use. This is an important issue because nitrous
oxide emissions are due to fertilizer-induced emissions from the soil and to indirect emissions
from nitrous fractions of fertilizers that were translocated by leaching or volatilization and
then emitted as N2O. The physical process of nitrous pollutants is very complex and sub-
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ject to many uncertainties (depending on weather conditions and soil erosion, the emission
coe¢ cients can double). And nitrous oxide is one of the most powerful GHG, with a radient
coe¢ cient 310 greater than CO2. As a matter of fact, Schulze et al. (2009) enlighten the
fact that current methane emissions from feedstock and nitrous oxide emissions from arable
agriculture are fully compensated in Europe by the carbon dioxide sink provided by forests
and grasslands. As a result, the balance for all GHG across Europes terrestrial biosphere is
near neutral, despite carbon sequestration in forests and grasslands and if the trend towards
more intensive agriculture is not reversed, Europes land surface may become a signicant
source of GHG. We can therefore consider the issue of carbon sequestration as a part of
the more general issue of land management, that has been extensively discussed, even if
all the characteristics of carbon sequestration have not been taken into consideration. For
example, Krcmar et al. (2001) emphasize the role of uncertainty, more specically in the
case of forestry which is of great importance because forests sequester carbon at a faster
rate than other terrestrial sinks. Singh and Lal (2005) or Pendell et al. (2007) examine all
use changes and soil/crop management practices with potential for carbon sequestration in
soils, i.e. conservation tillage methods, judicious use of fertilizers and manures, use of crop
residues, diverse crop rotations, and erosion control measures. Another encompassing view
of this range of issues consists in the consideration of agriculture as a provider of various
ecological services (Dale and Polasky, 2007), like preservation of landscape (Goldman et al.,
2007), preservation from desertication (Havstad et al., 2007). Antle and Diagana (2003)
already mentioned the need to consider co-benets of carbon sequestration.
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In connection with these issues, the question we want to challenge in this paper is the
following one: how could the regulator induce more carbon sequestration in agricultural land
whilst taking into account heterogeneity in potential for additional carbon sequestration?
This heterogeneity among regions, but also among plots of land in the same region (or
even among plots belonging to the same farmer) cannot be observed by the regulator. This
asymmetric information through private information on the farmers side depicts an adverse
selection setting. Furthermore, picking sequestering practices could imply changes in the use
of more fertilizers and pesticides and could generate positive or negative externalities such as
variation in the groundwater pollution. This adds another source of asymmetric information
and requires a more sophisticated regulation policy whilst taking into account the positive
externality of sequestering carbon as well as the joint externalities.
In this paper, our aim is to set incentive mechanisms to enhance carbon sequestration
as a principal-agent relationship between a regulator and agricultural rms. Asymmetric in-
formation indeed prevents a regulator from using rst-best economic instruments as long as
farmers get information rents. Moreover, a novelty in our paper is to show that the potential
for additional carbon sequestration is similar to an exhaustible resource and its originality
is that we construct a model which is built on two di¤erent streams of the theoretical lit-
erature: optimal exploitation of an exhaustible resource and mechanism design (Myerson,
1979; Baron and Myerson, 1982; Baron, 1989; La¤ont and Martimort, 2002). We obtain an
intertemporal principal-agent model with adverse selection. Our contribution is to specify
di¤erentiated contracts in order to induce truthful revelation by the rms regarding their in-
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trinsic characteristics towards carbon sequestration (in a similar line than Wu and Babcock,
1996 or Canton et al., 2009 except that spatial targeting of our measures would be impossible
due to the monitoring costs), and we analytically characterize the optimal path to sequester
carbon as an exhaustible resource. The proposed contract has the advantage to avoid the
ine¢ ciency of the per-hectare subsidy as well as the excess cost of the per-ton subsidy, and it
overcomes the unfairness of the incentive mechanism mentioned by Kurkalova et al. (2004)
by not penalizing precocious adopters of more sequestering practices.
This paper is organised as follows. In Section 2, we describe our assumptions and the
model design. In Section 3, we analyse the social planner objective, and we give the menu of
contracts regarding complete and incomplete information. Last, we provide a few extensions
to our analysis and public policy proposals in Section 4.
2 The model
2.1 Carbon sequestration potential
Potential for additional carbon sequestration is at the core of our analysis. We describe
here what is at stake. The heterogeneity depends on land quality as well as on past and
upcoming crops and management practices by agricultural rms. Plots of land can be of
di¤erent qualities. Even in case of equal quality, the ability of plots of land to sequester
carbon can di¤er, according to the past crops and practices. In specic plots of land of a
given quality, there is an intrinsic maximum potential for additional quantities of carbon.
11
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The heterogeneity between two plots of land due to the dynamics of carbon sequestration is
represented by the following gure (Figure 1), according to most empirical studies (INRA,
2002). To illustrate the mechanism, assume that there are four kinds of practices or crops (A,
B, C, D), each of them allowing to sequester a maximum potential SA < S

B < S

C < S

D. The
maximal absolute potential for carbon sequestration is the same (SD) for two plots of land.
Suppose that more sequestering practices had been adopted on plot 1 sooner than on plot 2.
On plot 1, the farmer decided to switch from practice B to practice C and engaged on a new
dynamics of sequestration from SB to S

C . On plot 2, the decision was taken later to switch
from practice A to practice B and then to sequester carbon progressivily until SB. At the
date of implementation of the policy (T0), the potential for additional carbon sequestration
of plot 1 (S1) is less than the potential for additional carbon sequestration of plot 2 (S2).
Given the available practices and crops, any plot of land can be entirely characterized by
its potential for additional carbon sequestration, that depends on its soil nature, its location
and -more specically and unobservable- on its history of crops and practices.
2.2 The distribution of agricultural rms
By assumption, the economy is composed by a continuum of competitive agricultural rms
and by a representative consumer.
On the rms side, crops and practices by an agricultural rm allow for carbon seques-
tration ows denoted by qt whereas the cumulated carbon stock is set as St2. C(yt; qt; et; st)
are exploitation costs for an individual rm established by the rm output yt, the carbon
2Throughout this paper the time period is denoted by the subscript t.
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sequestration ow qt, the non-point source polluting emissions due the production processes
et, and its remaining potential for additional carbon sequestration st which is dened as the
gap, during period t, between the potential for additional carbon sequestration in this plot
of land and accumulated stocks. This gap can be formally written as st = S   St, i.e., this
is the remaining potential for carbon sequestration. Our cost function modelling can be ex-
plained as follows. The e¢ ciency of a particular rm in sequestering is directly linked to its
potential for additional carbon sequestration denoted by S. We assume that the real type of
the rm is distributed according to S in a continuous manner such that S 2 Sinf ; Ssup. Sinf
therefore accounts for the least e¢ cient type or the rm with the lowest additional potential
for carbon sequestration while Ssup accounts for the most e¢ cient type or the rm with the
highest additional potential for carbon sequestration. f(S) represents the probability density
function on

Sinf ; Ssup

and F (S) is the cumulative distribution function, which are known
by the regulator. By assumption, the less the crops and the practices were previously seques-
tering, the less it is costly to switch to better practices (Antle et al., 2002). The total cost
negatively depends on the additional potential for carbon sequestration S. For exhaustivity,
our cost function allows for the encompassing hypothesis that exploitation costs depend on
the remaining potential in carbon sequestration for each rm st. We may notice that this
cost dependency on the accumulated stock does raise an asymptotic cost growth (Levhari
and Liviatan, 1977). In the following, we will distinguish two cases: the global cost depends
only on initial conditions about carbon sequestration ability, i.e., on the potential for ad-
ditional carbon sequestration S (assumption A4) or it depends on the remaining potential
for additional carbon sequestration st (assumption A40). We may underline that assumption
13
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A40 encompasses assumption A4.
The cost function C(yt; qt; et; st) is dened by the following assumptions (A):
 A1 : Cy  0; Cyy = @2C=@y2  0; convexity in the output yt;
 A2 : Cq  0; Cqq = @2C=@q2  0; convexity in the carbon sequestration ow qt;
 A3 : Ce  0; Cee = @2C=@e2  0; convexity of the abatement cost ( Ce) in the polluting
emissions et;
 A4 : C S = @C=@ S  0; and C S S = @2C=@ S2  0: the lower S is, the higher the costs
for sequestering practices in the future;
 A40 (alternative hypothesis) : Cs = @C=@s  0 (@C=@S  0), and Css = @2C=@s2  0;
 A5 : Cyq = @2C=@y@q  0; increasing in both arguments, Cey = @2C=@e@y  0 and
Ceq = @
2C=@e@q  0; decreasing in both arguments, and Cqs = @2C=@s@q  0; CyS =
@2C=@S@y  0;
CqS = @
2C=@S@q  0; CeS = @2C=@S@e  0;
 A6 : d
dS
(
F (S)
f(S)
)  0 or equivalently d
dS
(
1  F (S)
f(S)
)  0 respectively increasing and
decreasing in S that account for monotone inverse hazard rates properties.
The remaining potential for additional carbon sequestration st (st = S   St) reects
asymmetric information with adverse selection through S that arises when agricultural rms
do not display their real characteristics regarding their potentials for carbon sequestration.
14
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2.3 The social planner objective
As agricultural sustainable practices elevate the quantities of carbon in soils, the accumulated
carbon stock in the atmosphere decreases, which raises welfare in the economy. The consumer
surplus (V ) depends on the sum of the agricultural output Yt =
R Ssup
Sinf
ytf(S)dS, on the
total sequestered carbon stock t =
R Ssup
Sinf
Stf(S)dS and on the total polluting emissions
Et =
R Ssup
Sinf
etf(S)dS. The planner social welfare function can then be dened as the sum of
the consumer surplus (V ) and the prots of all agricultural rms  =
R Ssup
Sinf
(yt; qt; st)dS,
that is W = V +.
The consumer surplus writes:
V = U(Yt;t; Et) 
Z Ssup
Sinf
ptytf(S)dS   (1 + )
Z Ssup
Sinf
T (S)f(S)dS
with UY  0, US  0, UE  0
and Inada conditions : US(S = 0) = +1 and lim
S!0
SUS = 0
where  is the marginal cost of public funds or the opportunity cost of the regulation; T (S)
is the monetary transfer given to the rm to infer carbon sequestration in its plots of lands;
pt is the exogenous market price of the agricultural commodity.
The prot of an agricultural rm is:
(yt; qt; et; st) = ptyt   C(yt; qt; et; st) + T (S)
Even if the choice variable of the regulator is the level of the subsidy individualized according
15
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to the characteristics of the rm, it is much more signicant to consider that, by setting a
level of subsidy, the regulator actually chooses the rms prot. By rewriting the previous
equation, we can obtain the level of subsidy T (S) needed for allowing a given prot to the
rm:
T (S) = (yt; qt; et; st)  pyyt + C(yt; qt; et; st)
Introducing this expression in V , and then into W we obtain the following social welfare
function that the planner seeks to maximize:
W = U(Yt;t; Et)
+
Z Ssup
Sinf
[ptyt   (yt; qt; et; st)  (1 + )C(yt; qt; et; st)] f(S)dS
We assume here that all agricultural rms are committed to the policy. In fact, Wu
and Babcock (1999) show that voluntary programs in agriculture can be more e¢ cient than
mandatory programs in agriculture when the marginal cost of public funds is zero or small and
if the number of involved rms is large. From a technical point of view, because of the Inada
condition and because the reservation prot of the rm is null under perfect competition, the
shutdown of the less e¢ cient rms is never desirable (La¤ont and Martimort, 2002).
3 Information and incentives
3.1 The complete information case
16
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With complete information, each agricultural rm potential for additional carbon sequestra-
tion denoted by S is perfectly known by the planner whose problem of maximizing social
welfare is:
max
yt;qt;et
W =
Z 1
0
U(Yt;t; Et)e
 tdt
+
Z 1
0
Z Ssup
Sinf
[ptyt   (yt; qt; et; st)  (1 + )C(yt; qt; et; st)] f(S)dSe tdt
st
8>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>:
(yt; qt; et; st)  0
st = S   St
_St = qt or St =
R t
0
qd  S
S0 = 0; 0
where (yt; qt; st; et)  0 is the participation constraint. t is the value of the costate variable
at date t. S0 is the initial value following the implementation of the public policy and equals
0. 0 is the initial value of the costate variable associated to the sequestration process. The
transversality condition is given by limt!1 e ttqt = 0.
Whilst giving a monetary transfer to the rms, the social planner increases rmsprot
that is not suitable with regards to social welfare. The social planner would allow to the
rms the lowest prots. The participation constraint is therefore binding for all rms,
(yt; qt; st; et) = 0.
17
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The current value hamiltonian H for the social planners problem is then:
H = U(Yt;t; Et) +
Z Ssup
Sinf
[ptyt   (1 + )C(yt; qt; et; st)] f(S)dS + tqt
The rst-order necessary conditions are (equation (4) with respectively Assumptions A4 and
A4):
@H
@yt
= 0, (UY + pt) = (1 + )Cy (1)
@H
@qt
= 0, t = (1 + )Cq (2)
@H
@et
= 0, UE = (1 + )Ce (3)
 @H
@St
= _t   t ,
_t
t
=
8>>><>>>:
  US
t
(A4)
  US
t
  (1 + )CS
t
(A40)
(4)
In (1), we have
pt = Cy (1)
as the rm is price taker on the global market (UY = pt).
The rm produces the output of perfect competition which equals the market price to its
marginal cost.
The optimal amount of polluting emissions is set in (3) by the equality between the
marginal damage of emissions (UE  0) and the marginal abatement cost raised by the
marginal cost of public funds ((1 + )Ce  0). This has important consequences on the
level of output and also of carbon sequestration ows. Since the regulator takes into account
18
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the damage due to the induced pollution, the optimal level of emissions is lower than it
would have been in the decentralized equilibrium. Because these emissions result of the use
of fertilizers in order to compensate the loss in yield, we have assumed that Cey  0 and
Ceq  0, which give that at the optimum, Cy and Cq are also lower than when ignoring
the damage due to the emissions. As a result, the level of output and the ow of carbon
sequestration are also lower.
The equation (4) can easily be interpreted when written as
t =
8>><>>:
_t + US (A4)
_t + US + (1 + )CS (A4
0)
(4)
where U is a concave function with a decreasing marginal utility towards the accumulated
carbon stock S (US  0; USS  0). Because the ow of carbon sequestration is decreased by
the lower optimal level of emissions, the rate of growth of the shadow price of the carbon
stock is also lower than when ignoring the damage due to the emissions.
This is a Hotelling rule regarding the exploitation of the exhaustible resource which is the
potential for additional carbon sequestration, s. To interpret (4), we refer to the remaining
potential for additional carbon sequestration s as the state variable in connection with the
accumulated carbon stock S (st = S   St; _st =  qt).
Our cost-benet analysis can be explained such that:
 t accounts for the marginal cost when the agricultural rm does not sequester at the
current time period (with the discounted rate ). In other words, this is the marginal
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cost when the agricultural rm does not extract the resource in carbon sequestration,
and this is the cost when the ow qt does not take place;
 _t is the marginal benet when the rm does not sequester / does not extract the
resource in carbon sequestration at the current time period; the potential for additional
carbon sequestration is therefore not reduced for the future;
 US (=  Us) is the marginal utility of the representative consumer when the accumulated
carbon stock S increases (resp. when the potential for carbon sequestration s is not
reduced); this stands for the avoided damage due to carbon sequestration;
 CS (=  Cs) accounts for the marginal cost when the agricultural rm increases the
accumulated carbon stock S (resp. decreases the potential for additional carbon se-
questration s).
As a result, we get the following Proposition.
Proposition 1 With complete information, the potential for additional carbon sequestration
is similar to an exhaustible resource and the carbon sequestration process occurs following the
optimal path dened by this Hotelling rule with trade-o¤s.
3.2 The incomplete information case
With incomplete information, the planners objective is to derive the social optimum with an
adverse selection setting. To this end, we lean on the revelation principle (Myerson (1979),
Baron andMyerson (1982), Baron (1989)). This direct mechanism allows that the rms reveal
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their real types S, i.e., their real potential for additional carbon sequestration unknown by
the planner.
The contract is a monetary transfer - sequestration ow contract
 
T (S); q(S)

where T (S)
is the subsidy depending on the potential for additional carbon sequestration S.
Assuming that the rm claims eS, the prot of an agricultural rm is:
(yt; qt; et; S   St; eS) = ptyt(eS)  C(yt(eS); qt(eS); et(eS); S   St) + Tt(eS) (5)
The Incentive Constraints (IC1; IC2) and the Participation Constraint (PC) are
IC1 : S(yt; qt; et; S   St; eS)eS=S =  CS(yt(eS); qt(eS); et(eS); S   St)  0 as CS  0 (6)
The sole rational announce is then eS < S. This announce is close to Sinf in order to get the
highest subsidy.
IC2 : SS(yt; qt; et; S   St; eS)eS=S  0
PC : (yt; qt; et; S   St)  0
Condition (6) gives the positive marginal information rent for the rm: S(yt; qt; et; S  
St; eS)  0 because CS  0. The marginal information rent increases as S is greater.
A rm close to Ssup uses practices and has initial cultivations which allow one of the
highest total sequestration levels. Accordingly, the higher this potential is (S ! Ssup), the
less expensive the sequestration practices are for a high quality of agricultural soils. A rm of
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type eS will announce the type of the less e¢ cient rm (or close to the less e¢ cient one), Sinf ,
in order to get the highest available subsidy Tt(eS). The less e¢ cient rm is the only one that
cannot understate its potential and therefore that is unable to extract the least information
rent.
The information rent is then:
(yt; qt; et; S   St) = (yt; qt; et; Sinf   St) +
Z S
Sinf
 CS(y(); e(); q();    S )d (7)
where (yt; qt; et; Sinf   St) is the prot of the rm characterized by the lowest potential for
additional carbon sequestration, i.e., the reservation prot,
and
Z S
Sinf
 CS(y(); q(); e();    S )d accounts for the informational benet of any
rm characterized by a higher potential (Sinf < S).
The monotonicity condition holds as the monotone inverse hazard rate property is a
su¢ cient condition insuring separating contracts (Assumption A6). Another Assumption
(A7) is necessary to set that the iso-prot curves of the agricultural rms cross only once
in (T; q); this is the Spence-Mirlees condition or single-crossing property. This leads to the
following lemma (See the proof in the Appendix 5.1).
Lemma 2 The Spence-Mirrlees condition sets that the environmental e¤ort in carbon seques-
tration activities is greater for the most e¢ cient agricultural rms towards Ssup,
@qt(S)
@S
 0:
With incomplete information, the planners problem of maximizing social welfare is to
maximize the expected mean E(W ), that is
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max
yt(S);qt(S);et(S)
E(W ) =
Z 1
0
U(Yt;t; Et)e
 tdt
+
Z 1
0
Z Ssup
Sinf
2664 ptyt   (yt; qt; et; st)
 (1 + )C(yt; qt; et; st)
3775 f(S)dSe tdt
st
8>>>>>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>>>>>:
IC1
IC2
(yt; qt; et; st)  0 (PC)
_St = qt or St =
R t
0
qd  S
S0 = 0; 0
Integrating (7) by parts leads to (see Appendix 5.2)
Z Ssup
Sinf
(yt; qt; et; S   St)f(S)dS = (yt; qt; et; Sinf   St) 
Z Ssup
Sinf
CS(1  F (S))dS (8)
Inserting (8) in the expected social welfare E(W ), we obtain
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max
yt(S);qt(S);et(S)
E(W ) =
Z 1
0
U(Yt;t; Et)e
 tdt
 
Z 1
0
Z Ssup
Sinf

(1 + )C(yt(S); qt(S); et(S); S   St)

f(S)dSe tdt
 
Z 1
0
Z Ssup
Sinf



(CS(yt(S); qt(S); et(S); S   St))
(1  F (S))
f(S)

f(S)dSe tdt
 
Z 1
0
(yt; qt; et; Sinf   St)e tdt
st
8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
(yt; qt; et; Sinf   St)  0
_St = qt or St =
R t
0
qd  S
S0 = 0; 0
t is the value of the costate variable at date t. S0 and 0 are the initial values of the carbon
stock and the costate variable. The transversality condition is limt!1 e ttqt = 0.
By writing again the current value hamiltonian, one obtains the rst-order necessary
conditions:
py = Cy   
(1 + )

(1  F (S))
f(S)
CSy

(9)
t = (1 + )Cq   

(1  F (S))
f(S)
CSq

(10)
UE = (1 + )Ce   

(1  F (S))
f(S)
CSe

(11)
t =
8>><>>:
_t + US (A4)
_t + US + (1 + )CS + 

(1  F (S))
f(S)
CSS

t
(A40)
(12)
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From these necessary conditions, we can observe that unlike the complete information
case, new terms appear in the equations: these terms account for the marginal information
costs. As a result, we get the trade-o¤ for the regulator between e¢ ciency in the sequestra-
tion activities and informational rents. Optimal sequestration ows qt(S) set the monetary
transfers in our contract design
 
T (S); q(S)

. Comparing these necessary conditions with
the ones obtained with complete information allow us to draw the following conclusions.
Firstly, the rm with the highest potential for additional carbon sequestration produces
the optimal agricultural commodity and sequesters carbon with respect to the optimal path
(a no-distortion at the top result). All other rms would get an information rent which allows
them to get a higher subsidy compared to the complete information case and to sequester
a lower amount of carbon. The social planner minimizes the cost of this regulation policy
by allowing the lowest possible information rents: the prot of the less e¢ cient rm is nil
and the others get a subsidy. This leads to distortions to the less e¢ cient rms (Baron and
Myerson, 1982)3. It is actually a kind of reward because in this model, the lower e¢ ciency
of a rm is due either to its sooner adoption of sequestration practices or to the inadequate
nature of its soil.
Secondly, because the Hotelling rule is changed by incomplete information about initial
conditions, when the cost function exhibits a stock dependency (A4), it follows that incom-
plete information always slows the sequestration process but does not prevent from obtaining
the highest potential for additional carbon sequestration as soon as di¤erentiated subsidies
3Because the potential for additional carbon sequestration is similar to an exhaustible resource, our
results are close to those obtained in the case of exploitation of such an exhaustible resource with incomplete
information (Hung et al., 2006).
25
 
Documents de Travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne - 2010.60
are provided at each period of time (12), if and only if the global cost is not asymptotic (A4);
with A4, the maximal absolute potential cannot be reached even with complete information.
This leads to the following Propositions.
Proposition 3 With incomplete information, the regulator has to trade-o¤ between the
e¢ ciency in the sequestration activities and informational rents allowed to the agricultural
rms.
Proposition 4 With incomplete information, the potential for additional carbon sequestra-
tion is similar to an exhaustible resource and the carbon sequestration process occurs following
the optimal path dened by this Hotelling rule with trade-o¤s as with complete information;
di¤erentiated subsidies have to be provided at each period of time. However, the sequestration
process is slowed and this relies on the extent of the rms types.
4 Conclusion
In this paper, we have investigated the potential for additional carbon sequestration in agri-
cultural soils whilst designing incentive mechanisms for rms related to land heterogeneity.
The policymaker has to choose between the less expensive of these policies: the incentive
policy as she o¤ers a rewarding contract, and she might accept the cost of asymmetric in-
formation and gives higher subsidies in order to induce revelation by the agricultural rm of
its private information; the full monitoring policy if this is technically feasible as she mon-
itors the cultivations and management practices of the agricultural rm towards the real
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sequestered carbon stocks in a perfect and continuous manner to provide subsidies. One of
the novelty of our paper is to show that our analysis is strictly similar to the standard problem
of the exploitation of a natural exhaustible resource of which available stock is unknown; we
proceed by an original way to view carbon sequestration and incentives to agricultural rms
in a dynamic setting. The proposed contract has the advantage to avoid the ine¢ ciencies of
standard subsidies - per-hectare and per-tonne - by identifying agricultural rms and induce
truthful revelation, and to provide a fair reward for each rm. We also show that taking
into account the joint externalities of carbon sequestration may lead the regulator to slow
down the sequestration process, but without stopping it, when the induced externalities are
negative. In the opposite case, the regulator will nd optimal to accelerate the process. This
result emphasizes the need to accurately evaluate the possible externalities due to carbon
sequestration, especially because they are also heterogenous.
Finally, we may consider a few extensions of our model and analysis. Incomplete infor-
mation would also appear through moral hazard which is created by high costs of monitoring
implying that rms do not fullll to their contractual commitment. As we have shown that
taking into account the dynamics of carbon sequestration does not modify the standard rea-
soning about ex ante incomplete information, we can then accept the standard result about
ex post incomplete information, without any additional economic modelling. With incom-
plete information regarding the strategy of the rm during the contract, the planner must
give a greater subsidy in order to induce the requested behaviour by the rm. Throughout
the paper, we have assumed that the contract has been signed at the beginning of the rst
period with full committment between both parts. According to the revelation principle, by
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accepting the contract, the rm reveals its real type. One could then argue that the regula-
tor does not need to commit in the upcoming periods but can use the revealed information
to negociate a new contract from period two. Nevertheless, if adverse selection disappears,
moral hazard is very likely to remain through time. In any case, asymmetric information
increase the cost of regulation without preventing the regulator to achieve her goals.
Regarding the time length of the contract, in our framework, we could dene two stages:
the rst stage would account for the carbon sequestration process stage while the second stage
would represent the stationary carbon level stage4. If we suppose that it is never optimal to
stop to sequester carbon, the regulator must keep on providing a subsidy to the agricultural
rm even if the rm has reached its highest potential for carbon sequestration. This prevents
the rm from going back to practices that sequester less carbon in the second stage. The
carbon release into the atmosphere is actually quicker than during the sequestration stage5.
The main di¤erence between these stages is that asymmetric information is not an issue
in the second stage. The absolute potential for carbon sequestration can be reached only
if the production cost is not asymptotic (Levhari and Liviatan, 1977), i.e., if it does not
depend on the remaining potential for carbon sequestration. As we have seen that incomplete
information slows the sequestration process, and this postpones the optimal date of the end
of the contract.
4This is the stage when the upper bound in carbon sequestration has been reached.
5If the carbon value falls under the cost of sequestration, the optimal policy can be di¤erent, as is shown
by Ragot and Schubert (2008) who take into account the heterogeneity of land and the dynamics of carbon
sequestration and carbon release in a macroeconomic model.
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6 Appendix
6.1 The single-crossing property
The Spence-Mirrlees condition or single-crossing property can accordingly be derived from
any rm prot function as follows:
@
@S
"
@(eS)
@ eS
#
= 0
, @
2
@S
2 +
@2
@ eS@S = 0 where @
2
@S
2  0 and
@2
@ eS@S  0
@2
@S
2  0 from prot maximizing second-order condition
and
@2
@ eS@S  0 as
@2
@ eS@S =  CyS @yt@ eS   CqS @qt@ eS   CeS @et@ eS  0
where CyS  0, CqS  0 and CeS  0 (A5)
which leads
 CyS
@yt
@ eS  CqS @qt@ eS + CeS @et@ eS
, @yt
@ eS   CqS CyS
@qt
@ eS
+  CeS CyS
@et
@ eS
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that is a su¢ cient condition for
@yt
@ eS eS=S  0 and @qt@ eS eS=S  0
6.2 Integration by parts
Integrating (7) by parts leads to
Z Ssup
Sinf
(yt; qt; et; S   St)f(S)dS = (yt; qt; et; Sinf   St) 
Z Ssup
Sinf
CS(1  F (S))dS (8)
as 8>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>:
F (S) = prob(S < S)
G(S) = 1  F (S) = prob(S > S); 1 G(S) = F (S) = prob(S < S)
G(Ssup) = 0; G(Sinf) = 1
F 0(S) = f(S) < 0;G0(S) =  f(S) > 0
and
Z Ssup
Sinf
(yt; qt; et; S   St)f(S)dS =  

(S)G(S)
Ssup
Sinf
 
Z Ssup
Sinf
CSG(S)dS
= (Sinf) 
Z Ssup
Sinf
CSG(S)dS
= (Sinf) 
Z Ssup
Sinf
CS(1  F (S))dS
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